Consistency and Epistemic Probability Essay -- Argumentative Persuasiv

Consistency and Epistemic ProbabilityABSTRACT Is consistency unceasingly epistemologicalally virtuous? In this paper, I examine one threat to the conventional view that consistency is a minimum compulsion for rational belief. underlying to the telephone circuit is the nonion of epistemic probability, understood as the academic degree of substantiate or confirmation provided by the total available evidence. My strategy in examining this argument is to apply equal reasoning to carefully tailored examples. The conclusions which write out are substantive, informative and utterly implausible. I conclude, first, that the argument for inconsistency fails and, second, that it fails because epistemic probability does not conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. A plausible chute model for determining degree of support is briefly considered. Is consistency constantly epistemically virtuous? Is it possible for a set of rational beliefs to be uneven? The traditional view has been that logical consistency is a minimum requirement for rational belief. Recently, this traditional view has been challenged, and is now in some disrepute. The douse is not only of interest in its own right, but in addition has bearing on several other aspects of our conception of justified belief. In particular, it is a critical issue for the coherence theories of justification which have been so prominent of late, for coherence is normally understood in such a way as to presuppose logical consistency. (1)Three distinct lines of argument against consistency can be discerned in the current discussion (although not always clearly distinguished there) (i) the paradox of the lottery, (ii) the fallibility argument, the core of which is an inference from my fallibility in the past to ... ...e Probable and the Provable (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1977), 37. (7) Note that throughout this paper, an assumption has been make which is necessary for the epistemic probability argument, a s well as the analogous arguments, namely, that there is a degree of confirmation less than 1 which is able for justified belief. If this assumption were not granted, then, of course, no conclusion concerning warranted belief would follow. still the same arguments would show that, in the cases presented, there is strong confirmation that there is a natural therapy which cures AIDS (or that someone has exhibited psychic powers). And this conclusion is itself quite absurd. It can be avoided, however, only by rejecting the fit between degree of confirmation and the calculus.(8) This model for conjunction is endorsed by Pollock, op. cit., 248-49, and Cohen, op. cit., 221.